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The usual procedure in the theory of social choice consists in postu-
lating some desirable properties which an aggregation procedure should
verify and derive from them the features of a corresponding social
choice function and the outcomes that arise at each possible profile of
preferences. In this paper we invert this line of reasoning and try to
infer, up from what we call social situations (each one consisting of a
profile and the associated social ordering) the criteria verified in the
implicit aggregation procedure. This inference process, which extracts
intensional from extensional information can be seen as an exercise in
“qualitative statistics”.
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1 Introduction
Social outcomes arise from rather complicated decision-making arrange-
ments among individuals and organizations. The study of these processes
of aggregation of individual opinions yielding collective decisions gained mo-
mentum in the late 1940s. K. Arrow proved that a very simple set of con-
ditions on the aggregation process, intended to represent the features of
democratic systems, were impossible to be fulfilled simultaneously (Arrow
1951). Since then a great number of conditions both limiting and expanding
the possibilities of aggregation have been found.
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The literature on the subject starts by postulating conditions for the ag-
gregation processes and then deriving their properties, particularly those
related to its implicit “power structure” (i.e. whether it is dictatorial,
oligarchic, etc.). Here instead we will start with the class of possible in-
puts/outputs of those processes. Then we will look for a partition of this
class according to the equivalence among decision-making structures and
seek to determine the conditions that characterize each equivalence class.
This means that instead of deriving results from the conditions on the ag-
gregation procedure, we will characterize those conditions based on its in-
puts/outputs.
This procedure, which consists in deriving an intensional characteriza-
tion up from an extensional one is typical in Statistics. This is why we think
of this paper as an exercise in qualitative statistics. As we will see, there
is no complete equivalence between intensional and extensional characteri-
zations of social choice functions. Even so, some partial information can be
drawn by means of this procedure.
Any induction process depends on a previous relevance criterion. That
is, on a way of deciding which features should be taken into account and
which not. In the specific exercise we develop here, we focus on the idea
that names of alternatives are irrelevant. In other words, we assume the
well-known condition of neutrality. Notice that we use it here in a radically
different way than in the literature, where it is a property predicated on the
aggregation procedure. Here is an external condition we impose as analysts
to identify different profiles of preferences and social outcomes, classifying
them as being equivalent.1
A crucial step in our induction process is the definition of an equivalence
relation among input/output pairs of aggregation procedures, which we call
social situations, based on their decision structures. More precisely, the
equivalence is obtained by identifying (under the assumption of neutrality)
the decisive sets of those social situations.
Our approach is not without shortcomings, most notably the inability
to generate analytical descriptions of aggregation procedures. We are only
able to give a description of the decision structure supported by them and
moreover translate that into a formal theoretical language. Other relevant
properties of aggregation procedures may get lost by the application of the
criteria of neutrality and decision-equivalence to classify situations. Again,
1A related distinction, between criteria and axioms, is developed by Campbell and
Kelly (1997).
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this is an inevitable result of applying an inductive inference, compensated
by the possibility of detecting patterns in classes of social situations. In par-
ticular, our approach allows detecting all the properties satisfied by voting
rules (Austen-Smith & Banks, 1998).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the general ideas
of this paper and discusses the intended application of our results. In section
3 we present the partition of social choice situations in terms of permutations
of the names of both agents and situations. In section 4 we derive the
aggregation functions that correspond to the equivalence classes found in the
previous section. In section 5 we relate the aggregation functions with social
choice criteria (verified by the elements in the corresponding equivalence
class) and extract some properties of the aggregation function. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Elicitation of Axioms
The study of resource allocation mechanisms2 provides a general framework
of analysis in which we can state the main objectives of this paper. Unlike
that literature, we do not start with a description of the properties of the
process that leads from the preferences and endowments of the agents to
a social outcome.3 We start instead from the inputs and outputs of such
process and try to infer its properties. Of course, it is not enough to consider
only a single instance and thus we envision a class of environments E and
a family of (social) alternatives Z. Each environment is an exhaustive de-
scription of the relevant characteristics of the agents in the society. That is,
it provides all the information about the inputs for a social correspondence
f : E → Z that yields which alternatives are chosen at each environment.
The traditional problem in this setting is:
• Aggregation: given a family of axioms A representing some desired
properties, prove the existence and obtain the characterization of f
such that A is satisfied.
2See Hurwicz (1960), Mount & Reiter (1974), Reiter (1977), Reichelstein & Reiter
(1988) and Hurwicz & Reiter (2001), among others.
3A textbook example involves an environment consisting of the preferences of the agents
about a public good (for instance whether to build or not a bridge, or to install or not a
park in the neighborhood, etc.) and their willingness to pay for it. The social outcome will
be the decision of allocate or not resources to the public good and how much to extract
from each agent to cover the costs.
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We intend to solve the converse problem. Given any E ⊆ E and f =
{〈e, z〉 : e ∈ E, z ∈ Z} ⊆ E × Z we want to find the properties satisfied
by this social correspondence. Notice that f may only have an extensional
characterization, lacking a full-fledged analytic expression. Then, only a
partial list of its properties can be enumerated.
Determining the properties of f up from {〈e, z〉 : e ∈ E, z ∈ Z} involves
an inductive inference, whose study is the goal of this paper. Since for the
general setting given above the problem may be extremely complicated, we
restrict it to a framework in which each e ∈ E is just a profile of individual
orderings over a set S of alternatives while Z are (social) orderings of S. The
elements in this restricted family of pairs {〈e, z〉 : e ∈ E, z ∈ Z} are called
social situations. In this case, f is a social welfare function that assigns
a social ordering to a profile of individual preferences. Both the inputs
and outputs of the process represented by f are the components of social
situations.
These situations differ in either the individual preference orderings or in
the social orderings. Even so, if a certain form of neutrality is postulated (in-
dicating that the names of alternatives do not matter, up to permutations),
equivalences among the social situations can be found. We call this kind
of relation a decision-theoretic equivalence, denoted 'D. It defines a parti-
tion of the space of situations. Each equivalence class supports a function,
which we call prime. The aggregation (set-theoretical union) of equivalence
classes yields a new partition, in which each class corresponds to a social
choice function. The latter can be factored in terms of its underlying prime
functions.
This homomorphic relation between partitions and classes of functions
indicates that in order to extract the features verified by f it suffices to
look at its corresponding equivalence class. But the trick here is to spec-
ify adequately the information corresponding to the elements of that class.
Coalitions of individuals are labeled with some data: the pairs of alternatives
on which they are decisive and the permutations of names of alternatives
that leave their decisiveness invariant.
The method presented here yields the richest results when the class of
decision sets matches one in a “library” of well-known ones. But even if
there is no previous known structure to which associate the decision sets
obtained by the procedure, this information is useful, since it describes the
behavior of the implicit aggregation function (that is now described by its
decision sets).
The next sections will show the stepwise development of this method of
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extraction of the implicit information about f .
3 Partitions of the Space of Social Choice Situa-
tions
We will define a social choice situation with n individuals over a countable
set of alternatives S (|S| ≥ 3) as S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉, where each Ri ⊆ Sn
is agent i’s preference ordering and R̄ ⊆ Sn is the social ordering on S. We
do not place any restriction on the social order. In particular, we do not
require R̄ (unlike the individual preferences) to be a complete ordering.
We denote Ri(s, t) when agent i prefers (not necessarily in a strict way)
alternative t to alternative s. We restrict our attention to the situations in
which each individual ordering, Ri ∈ {R1, . . . , Rn}, is:
• reflexive: Ri(s, s) for each s ∈ S.
• complete: Ri(s, t) or Ri(t, s) for every s, t ∈ S.
• transitive: if Ri(s, t) and Ri(t, u) then Ri(s, u) for s, t, u ∈ S.
These conditions, that define Ri as a weak order, are usually seen as
representing the rationality (consistency) of a decision-maker. The class of
situations described so far is denoted Ŝ.
We will assume that the expression social choice situation applies only
to those in which the profiles of preferences verify these conditions. As we
wish to classify situations and then extract the information of the conditions
satisfied by the social choice situations, we should place ourselves in the
position of an outsider observer who has to decide which features must be
deemed relevant and which are just accessory ones.
The first point we make is that if we are trying to find a commonality
between different social choice situations it is convenient to think that the
names of alternatives are irrelevant. The reason for this choice is that if
we try to detect, say, the presence of the majority or the plurality rule,
it does not matter which are the actual alternatives: those rules act in the
same way independently of the names of the elements in S.4 In our case S is
fixed, and so, to apply this criterion, we assume that the family of admissible
4Notice that we could also apply anonymity, i.e. independence of the names of the
agents. But then, for instance, all dictatorial rules would become identified, critically
reducing the number of aggregation procedures that our inductive method is able to
characterize.
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automorphisms (“name changes”) over S constitutes a group. For this it is
enough to take GS = {γ : S → S} to be the set of all possible permutations
of elements in S.
Keeping in mind that we treat the names of social alternatives as if they
were irrelevant, we are interested in identifying different social situations
through an equivalence relation. The basic notion on which such an equiva-
lence can be defined is that of decisive sets. As defined by Arrow, a decisive
set for an alternative s over another t is the family of agents such that,
if each of them prefers s to t, then in the social order s must be above t.
That is, a decisive set represents the individuals that, if they agree on the
preference over two alternatives, they can impose this preference on the rest
of the society.
We will then consider that two social situations are equivalent if their
decisive sets are the same under a renaming of the alternatives. In this
way, we capture the idea that the agents behave analogously in both social
situations and thus the corresponding social choices are the same up to
a renaming of the alternatives. Formally, we define a binary relation Ŝ,
'D(GS), which we call decision-equivalence:
Definition 1 Two social choice situations, S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉 and S
′
=
〈S,R′1, . . . , R
′
n; R̄
′〉 are decision-equivalent, S 'D(GS) S
′
, if and only if there
exist a permutation γ ∈ GS such that for each pair s, t ∈ S we have that
DS({s, t}) = {i : Ri(s, t) iff R̄(s, t)} =
= {i : R′i(γ(s), γ(t)) iff R̄
′
(γ(s), γ(t))} = DS
′
({γ(s), γ(t)})
If R̄(s, t) is undefined, we state by convention that DS({s, t}) = ∅.
In words: two social choice situations are decision-equivalent if and only
if there exist a renaming of the alternatives (an automorphism in GS) that
makes their decisive sets coincide. Informally, this amounts to saying that
two situations are equivalent if their implicit “power structure” (i.e. the
coalitions of agents that impose their will over the rest) is the same, except
for the renaming of alternatives. The intuition is that both situations result
from applying the same aggregation procedure, which is independent of the
names of the alternatives.
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Example 1 Consider two situations in which three agents (1, 2 and 3) have
to decide:5
S = 〈{a, b, c}, {a ≺ b ≺ c}1, {b ≺ c ≺ a}2, {a ≺ b ≺ c}3; {{b ≺ c}, {a}}〉
and
S ′ = 〈{a, b, c}, {a ≺ c ≺ b}1, {a ≺ b ≺ c}2, {b ≺ a ≺ c}3; {{a ≺ c}, {b}}〉.
In both situations, the agents order linearly the three alternatives a, b, c
and the social outcome is similar: one alternative is preferred to another,
while the remaining one does not bear any relation with the other two alter-
natives. We have that
DS({b, c}) = {1, 2, 3} = DS
′
({a, c})
while, since one alternative is not related in the social orderings to the other
two, we have that
DS({b, a}) = DS({a, c}) = ∅ = DS
′
({b, a}) = DS
′
({b, c})
That is, S 'D S
′
under (12).
We can see here that thanks to our equivalence relation, we can both
simplify and enrich the information we are working with.
We have that:6
Proposition 1 The class Ŝ of social choice situations is partitioned by
'D(GS).
Over each equivalence class S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) we can distinguish a partic-
ular class of decisive sets which will allow us to identify the class:
Definition 2 For S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) we can define, up to permutations, a class
of representative decision sets, FGS (S̄) satisfying the following condition:
5Notice that R̄ = {{b ≺ c}, {a}} and R̄′ = {{a ≺ c}, {b}}. This means that these social
orders are not complete. In the former case only b and c can be compared, while a is not
preferred (nor indifferent) to the other two alternatives. In the case of R̄′ the comparable
alternatives are a and c, while b remains unrelated to them.
6The proofs of the claims can be found in the Appendix.
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(i) for each situation S ∈ S̄ there exist a permutation γ ∈ GS such
that for each pair s, t ∈ S, D({s, t}) ∈ FGS (S̄), where D({s, t}) =
DS({γ−1(s), γ−1(t)}) and,7
(ii) there does not exist a permutation ρ : S → S such that
D({s, t}), D({ρ(s), ρ(t)}) ∈ FGS (S̄) with D({s, t}) = D({ρ(s), ρ(t)}).
Condition (ii) ensures that each D({s, t}) ∈ FGS (S̄) is uniquely deter-
mined, since otherwise we would have for every permutation ρ : S → S, a
class D({ρ(s), ρ(t)}) satisfying condition (i). On the other this means that
there are different ways of defining FGS (S̄), choosing its elements as to sat-
isfy both (i) and (ii). But all the possible alternative characterizations are
the same up to permutations of the names of alternatives. We only need to
ensure that once chosen one description of the class of representative decisive
sets, it remains the same in all ensuing analyses.
Given any situation S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉, its associated preference
profile is profS = 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉. For the entire class of situations, Ŝ, we
associate the class profŜ = {profS : S ∈ Ŝ} of all possible preference profiles.
OrdS denotes the class of all possible orderings of S. With these definitions
at hand we can now study the structure of aggregation functions:
Definition 3 A (partial) aggregation function is
f : profŜ → OrdS
In words: an aggregation function takes as its argument a profile of
preferences over S, profS , and yields a (partial) ordering of S.
8 Given the
permutation group GS , FGS is the class of aggregation functions such that,
given γ ∈ GS , each f ∈ FGS verifies γ(f(profS)) = f(profγ(S)). We will now
introduce a social welfare function containing minimal information, that will
be shown useful in our analysis:
Definition 4 An aggregation function f ∈ FGS is said to be prime iff there
does not exist an aggregation function f
′ ∈ FGS , f
′ 6= f , verifying that
f
′
(profS) 6= ∅ for some profS and f
′
(profS) ⊆ f(profS) for every profile
in profŜ .
7In more technical terms this means that for each S ∈ S̄ there exist a permutation γ,
such that FGS (S̄) is equivalent modulo γ to the class of decision sets of S.
8Notice that, on one hand, f(profS) may not necessarily coincide with the social relation
R̄ in the situation S. On the other hand, there might exist at least two elements s, t ∈ S
such that f(profS)(s, t) = ∅.
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That is, an aggregation function f is prime if there is no other function f
′
able to generate the same results as f on some profiles of preferences, while
it yields no relation for all other profiles (see footnote 8).
To make the description of aggregation functions more precise we need to
specify their domains and ranges. So, the domain of an aggregation function
f ∈ FGS is
Dom(f) = {profS ∈ profŜ : f(profS) = f(profγ(S)) 6= ∅, for every γ ∈ GS}
while its range is
Im(f) = {R ∈ Ord(S) : there exists profS ∈ prof(Ŝ), f(profS) = f(profγ(S)) = R,
for every γ ∈ GS} ∪ ∅.
Example 2 Consider two situations:
S = 〈{a, b, c}, {a ≺ b ≺ c}1, {b ≺ c ≺ a}2, {c ≺ a ≺ b}3; {a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ a}〉
and
S ′ = 〈{a, b, c}, {a ≺ b ≺ c}1, {a ≺ b ≺ c}2, {a ≺ b ≺ c}3; {a ≺ b ≺ c}〉.
These two situations are not equivalent since, for example, DS({b, c}) =
{1, 2} while all the decisive sets of S ′ include the three agents. So there do
not exist a possible permutation γ such that DS({b, c}) = DS
′
({γ(b), γ(c)}).
Consider an aggregation function f such that
{a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ a} = f({a ≺ b ≺ c}1, {b ≺ c ≺ a}2, {c ≺ a ≺ b}3)
and
{a ≺ b ≺ c} = f({a ≺ b ≺ c}1, {a ≺ b ≺ c}2, {a ≺ b ≺ c}3).
A possibility is to consider that f is the majority rule which, for every
pair of alternatives, yields the order among them preferred by the majority
of the agents (two over three, in this case). This aggregation function is not
prime since for example the unanimous rule that yields only the order that is
agreed upon by all the agents can explain also the social outcome in situation
S ′.
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This example shows, in particular, that non-equivalent situations may
respond to different aggregation functions (if one at least is not prime). This
intuition can be formalized as follows:
Theorem 1 Given S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) there exists a prime aggregation function
fS̄ ∈ FGS such that for any situation S = 〈S, profS ; R̄〉 ∈ S̄ we have that
fS̄(profS) = R̄.
Conversely, for any prime aggregation function f ∈ FGS there exists a
S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) such that
f(profS) = R̄ 6= ∅
for every S = 〈S, profS ; R̄〉 ∈ S̄.
4 Aggregation Functions and Partitions
The relation between equivalence classes in Ŝ/ 'D(GS) and prime functions
can be extended to all aggregation functions in FGS , according to the fol-
lowing property:
Definition 5 The class of aggregation functions FGS is partially ordered by
the set-theoretical relation of inclusion among their ranges, ⊆. That is, we
say that f  f ′ iff for every profile profS , f(profS) ⊆ f
′
(profS).
This ordering allows us to place any aggregation function at some level in
the ensuing hierarchy, and thus detect the prime functions that can jointly
generate its outcomes. We will show that this ordering has a parallel in
the coarsening ordering of partitions of social situations, showing that each
aggregation function as an associated partition. Thus each aggregation func-
tion’s decision sets can also be obtained as the union of more basic sets of
decision sets.
The order is indeed partial since it is reflexive, antisymmetric and tran-
sitive. It is not complete, that is, aggregation functions are not necessarily
comparable. On the other hand, since we have not placed any restriction on
the cardinality of S nor on the type of allowable social orderings, Ord(S)
can be as big as 2|S|. What really matters for our argument is that for
every possible f , its image is such that Im(f) ⊆ Ord(S). That is, FGS is
bounded from above. According to Zorn’s Lemma we have that every chain
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(linear suborder) in 〈FGS ,〉 has a maximal element. A similar argument
shows that, since ∅ bounds FGS from below, the existence of minimal (prime)
aggregation functions is ensured.
Example 3 Let us consider the family of q − quota aggregation functions:
for each profile 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉 and each s, t ∈ S, f q(〈R1, . . . , Rn〉)(s, t) iff there
exists a subset Iq ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, such that9 |Iq| = d q×n100 e and for each i ∈ I
q,
Ri(s, t). For the decreasing sequence q ↓1000 we have the following chain:
f100  . . . f99  . . . f0
i.e. from the unanimous aggregation function to the “anything goes” func-
tion.
The ordering among aggregation functions is reflected in the structure
of social situations:
Proposition 2 For any aggregation function f ∈ FGS there exists a family
of equivalence classes {S̄j}j∈J ⊆ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) such that
f(profS) = R̄
for every S = 〈S, profS ; R̄〉 ∈ ∪j∈J S̄j.
This indicates that each f ∈ FGS could be associated to a class in the
coarsening of the partition Ŝ/ 'D(GS). This shows, in turn, that the prop-
erties of any aggregation function can be analyzed in terms of the behavior
of unions of equivalence classes in the partition Ŝ/ 'D(GS).
The features of 〈FGS ,〉 are reflected in the aggregational ordering of Ŝ:
Definition 6 The aggregational ordering of Ŝ is a subclass of partitions of
Ŝ, 〈Πα〉α≥0, such that Π0 = Ŝ/ 'D(GS) and for every pair of indexes α < α
′
,
Πα is a refinement of Πα
′
, i.e., for every π ∈ Πα there exists π′ ∈ Πα
′
such
that π ⊆ π′.
Again, as in the case of Definition 2, the aggregational ordering is not
uniquely defined, but any pair of these possible orderings differ only by a
permutation of the names of alternatives. Thus, once chosen one ordering
9dre is the least upper integer bound of r.
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it must be the only one considered in all the subsequent analyses. But
which one is chosen is immaterial since the results are independent of the
specification of the aggregational ordering. Then we have the following
result:
Theorem 2 For every chain C, 〈f0, f1, . . . , f i〉 such that for every pair of in-
dexes k < k
′
, fk  fk
′
, there exists a subsequence 〈Πα0 ,Πα1 , . . . ,Παk , . . .〉k≥0
of 〈Πα〉α≥0, such that
Πα0 = Ŝ/ 'D(GS)= Π
0
and for every pair k < k
′
, αk < αk′ .
Moreover, if C = 〈f0, f1, . . . , f |C|〉, where |C| is the length of C, we have
that every fk is supported by a πk ∈ Παk .
That is, a chain of functions is associated by a chain of partitions. Fur-
thermore, each function in the chain is supported by a class in the corre-
sponding partition.
As discussed in Section 2, each equivalence class S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) is defined
by its decision sets, FGS (S̄) = {D(s, t)}s,t∈S . Notice that each aggregation
function f , associated to a particular πf in a partition Πf of Ŝ, is defined in
terms of the decision sets corresponding to πf .
More precisely, since πf ⊆ Ŝ/ 'D(GS), there exist a set of indexes J such
that πf = ∪j∈J S̄j and therefore the decision sets of πf are ∪j∈JFGS (S̄j) =
∪j{{D(s, t)}s,t∈Sj}j .
An immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is that the latter set, which we
call DEC(f),10 defines completely f . In other words:
Proposition 3 For every chain C in 〈FGS ,〉, C = 〈f0, f1, . . . , f |C|〉, there
exists a sequence
CDEC = 〈DEC(f0),DEC(f1), . . . ,DEC(f |C|)〉
such that DEC(fk) are the decision sets defining fk.
Moreover, for k < k
′
, DEC(fk) ⊆ DEC(fk
′
). That is, CDEC is a chain
under set-theoretic inclusion.
10That is, DEC(f) = ∪j{{D(s, t)}s,t∈Sj}j .
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5 Social Choice Criteria and Aggregation Func-
tions
Since the structure of aggregation functions is paralleled by the structure of
their corresponding decision sets we will concentrate on the latter, as they
summarize all the relevant information about the aggregation procedures.
To be more precise, we will derive the properties satisfied by any aggregation
function up from the characteristics of its corresponding decision sets.
A first step towards that goal is to “normalize” the decision sets corre-
sponding to each element in the partition:
Definition 7 Given an aggregation function f , if S and S ′ are in its
support, SUPP(f), for every s, t ∈ S, there exists a permutation γ ∈
GS such that either DS
′




D({s, t}) = {γ : S → S :
DS
′
({s, t}) ⊆ DS({γ(s), γ(t)})
or DS({s, t}) ⊆ DS
′
({γ(s), γ(t)});
for every S,S ′ ∈ SUPP(f)}
is the set of permutations that either transform the decision set of f for s and
t over S into a subset or a superset of every decision set for a permutation
of s and t over SUPP(f).
For each D({s, t}) ∈ DEC(f) we obtain a D({s, t}). The quotient of
permutations under DEC(f) is, after choosing a basic S∗ ∈ SUPP(f),11
DECGS (f) = {〈D({s, t}), D
S∗({s, t})〉 : DS∗({s, t}) ∈ DEC(f),S∗ ∈ SUPP(f)}.
Even if DEC(f) is more complex than DEC(f), it allows us to get rid
of the complications of using definitions modulo permutations. In fact, this
allows us to revert (in a sense) some of the effects of the neutrality applied
to obtain the decision sets. With this definition we capture all the possible
specific forms of a general aggregation rule.
Furthermore, the appropriate choice of a quotient S∗ yields the level in
the hierarchy of aggregation functions to which a given f belongs:
11We will omit the subscript GS , except when necessary.
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Proposition 4 Let S∗ ∈ SUPP(f) be such that for every s, t ∈ S and
every other situation S ∈ SUPP(f) there exists a permutation γ verifying
that DS
∗
({s, t}) ⊆ DS({γ(s), γ(t)}). Then, if f = f j∗, S∗ /∈ SUPP(f j), for
any j < j∗ in a chain 〈f0, f1, . . . , f j∗〉.
This means that all the relevant information about the decision sets of f
is compressed in the decision sets that are not permutations of decision sets
for any predecessor f j in a chain starting from a prime aggregation function.
It is straightforward to see that DEC(f) ⊆ GS×2n. But this potentially
enormous amount of possibilities can be substantially reduced if we note
that the second component of DEC(f) bears most of the information that
matters for the analysis of the structure of f . That is, once we have chosen
S∗ in the support of f , we know from Proposition 4 that the decision sets
over other elements in SUPP(f) can be obtained by applying a certain set
of permutations on the decision sets corresponding to S∗.
Then, we can just focus our attention over {DS∗({s, t}) : s, t ∈ S}. We
define a structure H(f) = 〈{1, . . . , n},DEC(f)〉, where the individuals are
seen as “nodes”, while each DS({s, t}) is a “hyperedge” among the nodes,
labeled both by the alternatives over which it is defined, {s, t} and the
class of permutations that preserve its decisiveness, D({s, t}). With this
characterization, H(f) is a labeled hypergraph.12
Now that we have found a way to show all the information in a compact
form, we will proceed by classifying {DS∗(s, t) : s, t ∈ S}, and then, by
finding some features of this social welfare function f .
Example 4 An instance in which we can easily find some features of the
aggregation rule, is when DEC(f) contains all the sets Q ⊆ 2n such that
|Q| ≥ d q×n100 e. In this case, the function involved is the q-quota aggregation
rule, because we need at least a q percent of agents to decide over a situation.
DEC(f) induces a social welfare function, denoted fDEC(f) as
for all s, t ∈ S,R(s, t) if and only if exists D ∈ DEC(f) such that for all
i ∈ D,Ri(s, t)
Some further definitions will help us to detect properties of f related to
its implicit power structure (i.e. the coalitions of agents that impose the
social results):
12In the case in which each hyperedge has a cardinality of 2 and dropping the labels we
obtain the notion of graph as a particular case.
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Definition 8 For any set D, let D denote a family of subsets of D.
• D is a prefilter over D if
1. D ∈ D
2. A ∈ D and A ⊆ B implies that B ∈ D
3. G a finite family of D implies that
⋂
G 6= ∅
• D is a filter over D if D is a prefilter and for all A,B ∈ D, A
⋂
B ∈ D
• D is an ultrafilter over D if D is a filter and for all A ∈ D,A ∈ D or
D\A ∈ D
A social welfare function f is said to be:
• oligarchic if there exists D ⊆ N such that
– every member of D has veto; and
– D ∈ DEC(f)





is nonempty. The set K(DEC(f)) is called a collegium.
• dictatorial if there exists an agent i (a dictator) such that Ri(s, t)
implies that R(s, t) for every pair of alternatives s and t.
With all these definitions at hand, we have the following result, that
just restates Theorem 2.7 in Austen-Smith & Banks (1998, p. 49) in our
setting:13
Theorem 3 Let DEC(f) be the set of decisive coalitions of f . If DEC(f) is:
1. an ultrafilter, then fDEC(f) is dictatorial.
13Notice that the literature always assumes as given the main properties and even the
functional form of the social welfare function and then derives its structure of decisive sets
to find the implicit power structure. Here instead, we start from nothing else than the
social situations and find those structures up from the equivalence among situations.
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2. a filter, then fDEC(f) is oligarchic.
3. a prefilter, then fDEC(f) is collegial.
In each case, fDEC(f) is weakly Paretian and independent of irrelevant
alternatives.
Let us see some examples that sheds some light on the entire procedure:
Example 5 Consider the following three social situations:
S = 〈{a, b, c}, {a ≺ b ≺ c}1, {b ≺ c ≺ a}2, {a ≺ b ≺ c}3; {{b ≺ c}, {a}}〉,
S ′ = 〈{a, b, c}, {b ≺ c ≺ a}1, {b ≺ a ≺ c}2, {a ≺ b ≺ c}3; {{b ≺ c}, {a}}〉
and
S ′′ = 〈{a, b, c}, {b ≺ a ≺ c}1, {a ≺ c ≺ b}2, {b ≺ a ≺ c}3; {{a ≺ c}, {b}}〉
In these situations, the agents order linearly the three alternatives a, b, c
and the social outcome is similar: one alternative is preferred to another,
while the remaining one does not bear any relation with the other two alter-
natives. We have that
DS({b, c}) = DS
′
({b, c}) = DS
′′
({a, c}) = {1, 2, 3}
It is easy to see that all the other decisive sets are empty. Then, we have
that S 'D S
′
under IdS and S 'D S
′′
under (12). The class of its decision
sets is:
FGS (S̄) = {1, 2, 3}
Maybe if we have more social situations, we can find another class of
decisive set. The decision set of f is:
DEC(f) = {1, 2, 3}
Finally we find that:
DEC(f) = {〈IdS , {1, 2, 3}〉, 〈(12), {1, 2, 3}〉}
With all these information we can construct the associated labelled hy-
pergraph:
H(f) = 〈{1, 2, 3}, {〈IdS , {1, 2, 3}〉, 〈(12), {1, 2, 3}〉}〉
Now we focus on DEC(f). We can see that it is a filter, so, using the
Theorem 3, we have that f is oligarchic. In this specific case, we have the
unanimity rule, because the oligarchy is made up of all the society (3 agents).
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Example 6 Consider the following four social situations:
S = 〈{a, b, c, d}, {a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ d}1, {a ≺ b ≺ d ≺ c}2, {d ≺ a ≺ b ≺ c}3; {a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ d}〉,
S ′ = 〈{a, b, c, d}, {b ≺ a ≺ c ≺ d}1, {b ≺ a ≺ d ≺ c}2, {c ≺ a ≺ b ≺ d}3; {b ≺ a ≺ c ≺ d}〉,
S ′′ = 〈{a, b, c, d}, {c ≺ a ≺ b ≺ d}1, {c ≺ a ≺ d ≺ b}2, {c ≺ b ≺ d ≺ a}3; {c ≺ a ≺ b ≺ d}〉
and
S ′′′ = 〈{a, b, c, d}, {a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ d}1, {a ≺ d ≺ b ≺ c}2, {c ≺ b ≺ a ≺ d}3; {a ≺ b ≺ c ≺ d}〉
Straightforward calculations indicate that they are not equivalent. We will
focus on DEC(f). If we only consider S ′,S ′′,S ′′′, we have that
DEC(f) = 〈{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}〉
is a prefilter, so we have that agent 1 belongs to the collegium. But, if we
consider S and S ′, we have that
DEC(f) = 〈{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}〉
is an ultrafilter and agent 1 is a dictator. This means that the addition of
situation S gives extra power to agent 1. On the other hand S by itself does
not allow to obtain any conclusion.
Some intuitions can be drawn from these examples. Depending on GS some
information is lost when considering H(f), in particular, anything that refers
to the name of an alternative. On the other hand, if DEC(f) has some proper
structure, the general criteria satisfied by the social welfare function (like
the existence of a collegium, dictator, etc) can still be detected.
In fact, if we consider the large class of voting rules (Austen-Smith &
Banks, 1998 p. 58), which consists of all the aggregation functions that can
be generated by their decision sets (assuming that some of the individuals
in them have only weak preferences over the alternatives), we have trivially:
Proposition 5 For every voting rule f , we can find DEC(f) such that
f = fDEC(f) and thus, H(f) captures all its relevant properties.
In such cases, then, we seek to write down the properties implied by
H(f).
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6 Theories up from H(f)s
The criteria satisfied by H(f) can be conceived as related to the axioms in
a formal system that defines the properties of the aggregation function. To
make this more precise let us give some definitions:
Definition 9 The formal language for aggregation functions over the set of
alternatives S and n agents, LSn, is a two-sorted first order language, and
the class of its sentences is SENT(LSn).14
A theory of an aggregation function on this setting is T ⊆ SENT(LSn)
such that T is consistent: T 6`⊥. A set of axioms for T is A ⊆ T such that
A ` T .
Example 7 Consider the case of the aggregation function f over three alter-
natives, which for three agents imposes agent 1’s will over the entire group.
We can denote this in FOL as:
φ1 : ∀x, y R(1, x, y)→ R̄(x, y)
where R̄(x, y) is interpreted as the more-than-or-equal preferential ordering
imposed by f , on x, y, which are variables ranging over the set of alternatives
{a, b, c}, while R(i, ·, ·) is such that its first argument ranges over the set of
agents, while the other two range over the alternatives. If we want to have
a theory of f , say T f , φ1 must be such that φ1 ∈ T f . Moreover, since φ1
characterizes the aggregation function, φ1 ∈ Af , i.e. it is an axiom of the
theory. On the other hand, it is clear that f verifies trivially the Pareto
condition, which can be represented as:
φP : ∀x, y [R(1, x, y) ∧R(2, x, y) ∧R(3, x, y)]→ R̄(x, y)
Then we have that φP ∈ T f and, moreover, that φ1 ` φP . Instead, if we
have that a formula like:
φ−1 : ∀x, y R(1, x, y)→ ¬R̄(x, y)
stating that 1 is an antidictator(i.e. what 1 chooses is never chosen by the




: ∀x, y R(1, x, y)→ R̄(y, x)
is, instead, not inconsistent with T f .
14For a general treatment of first-order logic see Smullyan (1995).
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The syntactic characterization given in Definition 9 has a model-theoretic
counterpart. That is, each sentence in LSn may be interpreted in such a way
that a theory T ⊆ SENT(LSn) can be seen as a set of claims about the
behavior of the constants and relations in the interpretation. If there exists
an interpretation M that satisfies (makes true) every formula of T it is
called a model of the theory. Moreover, if T is consistent it has at least one
model.15
In our case, as the previous example shows, the interpretation of symbols
in a theory about the behavior of an aggregation function is straightforward:
variables and constants range over the sets of individuals and alternatives,
{1, . . . , n} and S respectively, while any atomic expression R(i, x, y) is in-
terpreted as the preference of agent i over x, y, i.e. Ri(x, y). Finally, if
the interpretation is intended to be a model, R̄ is to be interpreted as the
social preference imposed by f . Therefore, any theory T f of a aggregation
function f has each situation S ∈ SUPP(f) as one of its models. More-
over, if S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉 /∈ SUPP(f), we have by definition that
f(prof(S)) 6= R̄. Then S is not a model of T f .
Given any structureM we may look for a theory for whichM is a model.
IfM has only a finite number of constants and relations defined over them,
it is easy to find a finite set of sentences that can be interpreted to yield
the true relations in the structure. Things become more interesting if we
intend to find a theory corresponding to a given a class of structures M̄. In
particular, we will try to find T f given SUPP(f).
As discussed above, the labeled hypergraph H(f) represents in summary
form the information about SUPP(f). It indicates the decisive sets for
every pair of alternatives and the permutations of agents that transform
the decisive sets for a situation into the decisive sets in another situation in
SUPP(f). This information is useful to derive T f .
As said, we expect to derive T f up from H(f) but first we have to show
that this is feasible. Notice that H(f) yields, applying the permutations
indicated in the labels of its hyperedges, a number of families of alternative
decision sets over the same set of alternatives. This information can be used
to reconstruct a class of social choice situations, namely those in SUPP(f).
Each of those is a model for a collection of first order formulas C. This
formulas obtain just translating the corresponding relations described by
15This is why in Example 7, φ1 and φ−1
′
are not inconsistent: there exist a model
where they are both true. In that model the social order is indifferent between any pair
of alternatives.
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H(f). Consider LSn as a two-sorted formal language with formulas built up
from the following elements:
• constants of the agent sort: Ī = {1̄, 2̄, . . . , n̄},
• constants of the alternative sort: Ā = {s̄, t̄, . . .}, such that |Ā| = |S|,
• a family of variables of the agent sort, Î, with elements ı̂, ̂, k̂, etc.,
• a family of variables of the alternative sort, X, with elements denoted
x, y, etc.,
• an individual propositional function, R(·, ·, ·) that ranges over Ī×Ā×Ā,
• a social propositional function R̄(·, ·) ranging over Ā× Ā,
• a family of functions ḠS where each γ̄ ∈ ḠS , γ̄ : Ā→ Ā is a permutation
of constants of the alternative sort,
• a family of functions Ḡn where each ρ̄ ∈ Ḡn, ρ̄ : Ī → Ī is a permutation
of constants of the agent sort,
• the usual connectives and quantifiers of first-order logic.
In this restricted language the information in H(f) can be immediately
expressed as follows. Each hyperedge is, as said, H = 〈I,PS ,Gn,GS〉,
where I is the set of agents connected by the hyperedge, PS ∈ S × S is
the pair of states over which those agents are decisive in DEC(f). Finally
Gn ⊆ Gn and GS ⊆ GS are the families of permutations that preserve
the decisiveness of I over PS . Then we can obtain a family of first order
sentences in SENT(LSn), which will be denoted Φf :
Definition 10 For each hyperedge H of H(f), if PS = 〈a, b〉 then, for every
i ∈ I, every ρ ∈ Gn and every γ ∈ GS, the sentence
φ : R(ρ̄(i), γ̄(a), γ̄(b))→ R̄(γ̄(a), γ̄(b))
is included in Φf .
Each S ∈ SUPP(f) constitutes an interpretation of Φf by construction.
This family is the basis on which we will define T f as:
T f = {µ ∈ SENT(LSn) : Φf ` µ}
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Notice that the number of formulas in T f is infinite. Even if S is finite,
if any S ∈ SUPP(f) is an interpretation for a formula φ ∈ T f , it also
interprets φ ∨ ψ, for any first order sentence ψ. On the other hand, since
we assume that each S ∈ SUPP(f) is a model for T f it follows that it is
consistent.
On the other hand, consider two different situations S and S ′ drawn
from SUPP(f). Since their corresponding decision sets are the same up to
permutations as defined in H of H(f), there exists an isomorphism between
S and S ′ , through the corresponding permutations. Technically, S and S ′
are said elementarily equivalent models of T f . A well known result in model
theory is (Stigum 1990):
Completeness Theorem: Let T be a consistent first order theory with
language L. Then, T is complete if and only if any two models of T are
elementarily equivalent.
Even if T f is well defined and has the desirable metamathematical prop-
erties of consistency and completeness, we are interested in finding an ax-
iomatization for f , which means a minimal number of formulas Af ⊆ T f
such that for every µ ∈ T f , Af ` µ. We say that Af is the set axioms of
T f .16
Two different cases may arise. One is when S and n are finite and the
other when either one is infinite. Each involves a different treatment.
6.1 Finite Number of Agents and Alternatives
In this case Φf is finite. It is easy to check out, by the properties of
the hyperedge H from which it was drawn, whether a given sentence φ,
R(i, a, b) → R̄(a, b) is verified by every ρ ∈ Gn and every γ ∈ GS or not.
Then
• If φ is verified by every ρ ∈ Gn and every γ ∈ GS , then define φ∀∀ :
∀ρ̄ ∀γ̄ [R(ρ̄(i), γ̄(a), γ̄(b))→ R̄(γ̄(a), γ̄(b))].17
• If φ is verified by every ρ ∈ Gn and by many but not all γ ∈ GS , define
φ∀∃ : ∀ρ̄ ∃γ̄ [R(ρ̄(i), γ̄(a), γ̄(b))→ R̄(γ̄(a), γ̄(b))].
16We will restrict the meaning of Af to be the non-logical axioms of T f . The logical
axioms are those of first-order logic.
17Notice that this sentence is still first order, since the quantifiers do not range over
propositional (i.e. truth-valued) functions.
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• If φ is verified by every γ ∈ GS and by not all ρ ∈ Gn, define φ∃∀ :
∀γ̄ ∃ρ̄ [R(ρ̄(i), γ̄(a), γ̄(b))→ R̄(γ̄(a), γ̄(b))].
• If φ is verified by some but not all ρ ∈ Gn and γ ∈ GS , define φ∃∃ :
∃ρ̄ ∃γ̄ [R(ρ̄(i), γ̄(a), γ̄(b))→ R̄(γ̄(a), γ̄(b))].
This means that each hyperedge H can be represented by a sentence,








H ). Of course, some information
is lost, but the decision structure is kept.
By a similar examination of the class {φH}H∈H(f), we obtain eight pos-
sible cases of the form
φ4 : 4Î ı̂ 4
1
Xx 42Xy φH
where 4Î , 4
1
X and 42X are either ∀ or ∃.
It is immediate that:
Proposition 6 The quantified sentences φ4 and φH entail the entire set of
sentences Φf :
{φ4} ∪ {φH}H∈H(f) ` Φf .
This result indicates that Af = {φ4} ∪ {φH}H∈H(f) provides a finite
axiomatization of T f . This family of axioms A conveys the minimal essential
information about social situations, while the full information is provided
by T f .
The set of axiomsAf can be seen in the light of the following classification
(Fishburn 1987):18
• Structural conditions. They prescribe conditions on the domain of ag-
gregation (individuals, alternatives and profiles). The structural con-
ditions just indicate the elements on which the aggregation procedure
will be applied. Easy examples are the requirement that all individual
preferential orderings have to be weak orders or that the number of
individuals has to be larger than 2.
• Existential conditions. They prescribe the existence of certain results
under an aggregation procedure. So, for example, an existential con-
dition is that there should not exist an individual such that for every
18They capture the features of voting rules, which are completely described by H(f), as
indicated in Proposition 5.
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profile her preferences coincide with those that result from the aggre-
gation procedure.19
• Universal conditions. They specify general aspects of the aggregation
procedure. The universal conditions can be further classified as in-
traprofile conditions, which involve no comparisons among profiles or
interprofile ones. An example of intraprofile conditions are the Pareto
condition, which indicates that if every individual in a profile prefers
more one alternative over another one, this feature must result also in
the social ordering. An interprofile condition is, instead, the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, which prescribes that if in two profiles
the preferences of the agents with respect to any pair of alternatives
are the same, then the order over these alternatives in the respective
social orderings must coincide.
It follows that:
• The joint characterization of S, n and the corresponding GS and Gn
yields the structural conditions on the aggregation function f .
• The sentences φH yield the interprofile conditions.
• The sentences φ4 summarize both the interprofile and intraprofile con-
ditions.
This indicates that to disentangle the intraprofile from the interprofile
conditions, more information is needed, which can be found in Φf . The
family of axioms Af , provides only the most general properties of f while
others can be derived from them. A simple example shows this:
Example 8 (Examples 5 and 6 revisited) Consider either one of the
unlabeled hypergraphs, say H(f) = 〈3, {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}〉. It constitutes,
as said, an ultrafilter, i.e. every subset A ⊆ {1, 2, 3} either A ∈ H(f) or
AC ∈ H(f), where AC = {1, 2, 3} \ A. Since {1, 2, 3} is finite, H(f) is a
principal ultrafilter. That is,
⋂
H(f) is a singleton. The element in this
singleton denotes a dictator.20 Then, the only φ4 axiom that can be derived
is φ : ∃̂ı ∀x,y R(̂ı,x,y) → R̄(x,y). In fact, Af = {φ}. Notice that the
19Notice that this non-dictatorship condition can be rewritten as to become the claim
of the existence of a pair of alternatives which for every individual and every profile verify
that the social outcome differs from the individual orderings.
20See Kirman & Sondermann (1972), Brown (1974) or Hansson (1976).
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variable ı̂ might be interpreted as being either one of the possible agents, 1, 2
or 3. That is, in this first order representation the information about the ac-
tual dictator is lost. Despite this, and given the knowledge already obtained,
it follows that the social choice implicit in the example can be implemented
in a dominant strategies equilibrium.
On the other hand, to get a theory that just implies the Φf , instead
of one as general as Af , we can just take Φf as the class of our axioms.
Since they are finite, the axiomatization is of course also finite. But this
procedure has a huge cost associated to it: all the advantages of extracting
intensional from extensional information are lost. It is as if we were running
a statistical procedure which obtains an exact characterization of the sample
by just enumerating its elements!
6.2 Infinite Number of Agents or Alternatives
As usual in social-theoretic (and more generally in economic-theoretic) anal-
yses, there is an interest in assessing outcomes when the number of individ-
uals is large. The formal treatment of those cases is based on identifying a
“large” number of agents with a (countably) infinite number of them, usually
yielding different results that in the finite case (Kirman and Sondermann,
1972). Notice that the language needed is no longer finitary, because of
the number of constants required to represent the infinite elements in the
domain. While this is a handicap, some results will allow us to recover a
characterization of the set of axioms Af similar to the presentation in the
previous section. Notice that those axioms are expressed with just a few
variables. Therefore, we can keep using a finitary fragment of LSn with the
proviso that it will be used only to write down Af .
Recall that H(f) is a hypergraph. We seek a family of sentences Af that
can be satisfied by H(f):
Definition 11 Af is satisfied if and only if there exists σ =
〈I,PS ,Gn,GS〉, where I ⊆ I is a set of agents, PS ∈ S × S is a pair
of states, while Gn ⊆ Gn and GS ⊆ GS are permutations over n and S, that
verifies (Kolany 1993):
• consistency: H ⊂ σ for no H ∈ H(f),
• transversality: σ ∩ INT (α) 6= ∅, for every sentence α ∈ Af , where
INT (α) is a hyperedge that yields a true interpretation of α.
24
The notion of satisfaction over hypergraphs is in fact equivalent to the ex-
istence of a system of distinct representatives, i.e. to the existence of
a transversal σ that has an element from each hyperedge. The existence of
such a σ is ensured by the following result:
Theorem(Hurwicz & Reiter 2001): H(f) has a transversal σ if and only if









H(f) that may ensure the
existence of σ:




• self-belonging: for every θ ∈
⋃
H(f), θ ∈ Υ(θ).
In fact, it follows that:
Proposition 7 There exists Υ that ensures the existence of a transversal
σ.
Finally:
Lemma 1 There exists a set of sentences Af in LSn that is satisfied by the
transversal σ. Moreover, each α ∈ Af can be either φ∀∀H , φ∀∃H , φ∃∀H , φ∃∃H or
φ4.
Therefore, as in the finite case, a set of axioms can be obtained for
a potential theory T f . However, as in the former instance, the axioms
of Af , while conveying the general properties of f , do not pinpoint their
precise details. Recalling that Φf is now an infinite enumeration of sentences
without quantifiers, we could apply the following theorem (Shoenfield 1967):
Theorem( Los-Tarski) A theory T is equivalent to a class of quantifier-free
sentences Φ if and only if every substructure of a model of T is a model of
T .
This means, in our case that a T f with precisely those sentences in Φf
and only those, must be such that its models have a “Russian doll” structure.
That is, for each model its substructures are also models. As in the finite
case, if we take the axioms of T f to be Φf , we have a trivial instance of
 Los-Tarski’s theorem. But in this case, added to the trivial identification of
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the intensional characterization with the extensional enumeration, we have
that the axiom system will no longer be finite.21
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented an exercise in inductive reasoning, namely, on
how to infer the criteria verified by social welfare functions, up from the ob-
servable behavior of their decision sets. We have shown that social welfare
functions keep a close relation with partitions of social choice situations.
Moreover, each social welfare function yields a corresponding labeled hyper-
graph.
As usual in inductive inference, the information extracted by the proce-
dure fleshes out the specific details of the characterization of the functions,
leaving only their bare bones. By doing this, it erases the differences among
similar functions, but at the same time it yields what we entertained origi-
nally to find: a few properties that are satisfied by them.
We understand that it can be very restrictive to ask the decisive sets to be
prefilters, filters or ultrafilters. We leave out of the analysis many other po-
tential structures by doing this. But if we continue studying them as labeled
hypergraphs, we can loosen the hypotheses. In particular, these hypergraphs
can be used to represent nerves of coverings by sets of agents, associated to
some decisions. This, in turn, may allow the connection between the com-
binatorial and the topological analysis of social choices (Chichilnisky 1980,
Baryshnikov 1997, Lauwers 2000).
On the other hand, even with these shortcomings, this approach provides
a tool for the elicitation of the information hidden in salient cases. Once
generalized, it may help to assess the possibility of implementing the implicit
social choice rule described in those cases.
This research points out, also, to a more general line of inquiry, namely
the extraction of intensional information up from an extensional description
in partitional form. While the method described is not independent from
the underlying problem, many of its features are modular and could be ap-
plied to other problems in Economic Theory.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 It is immediate from the definition of 'D(GS) that
for any situation S, S 'D(GS) S, just taking the identity permutation IdS,
which belongs to GS by (A2). That is, 'D(GS) is reflexive. To see that
it is symmetric, assume S 'D(GS) S
′
under a γ ∈ GS. Then, by (A3),
γ−1 ∈ GS, and thus S
′ 'D(GS) S. On the other hand, when S 'D(GS) S
′
and
S ′ 'D(GS) S
′′
we have that there exist permutations γ, γ
′ ∈ GS such that for
each s, t ∈ S





({γ(s), γ(t)}) = DS
′′
({γ′ ◦ γ(s), γ′ ◦ γ(t)})
That is
DS({s, t}) = DS
′′
({γ′ ◦ γ(s), γ′ ◦ γ(t)})
Since, by (A1) γ
′ ◦ γ ∈ GS, S 'D(GS) S
′′
. That is, 'D(GS) is transitive. 2
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Proof of Theorem 1 ⇒) Given S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) consider the family of
its decision sets, FGS (S̄) and define a function fS̄ as follows. For each
profile 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉 and for each pair s, t ∈ S, consider the decisive set
D({s, t}) ∈ FGS (S̄). Then, for every γ ∈ GS:
f(profγ(S)) = R(γ(s), γ(t)) iff for every i ∈ D({s, t}), Ri(γ(s), γ(t)).
By the definition of FGS (S̄), fS̄ ∈ FGS . Moreover, if for every S =
〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉 /∈ S̄ we define fS̄(R1, . . . , Rn) = ∅, it is immediate that fS̄
is prime.
⇐) Consider the class of situations with nonempty social orders which can
be seen as defined by an arbitrary prime aggregation function f ∈ FGS ,
Ŝf = {S ∈ Ŝ : S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉, f(R1, . . . , Rn) = R̄ 6= ∅}. As-
sume, by way of contradiction, that there exist two equivalence classes
S̄, S̄ ′ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) such that Ŝ
f ∩ S̄ 6= ∅ and Ŝf ∩ S̄ ′ 6= ∅. Consider two
situations S ∈ Ŝf ∩ S̄ and S ′ ∈ Ŝf ∩ S̄ ′. Then, S and S ′ are not equivalent.
This can happens for two reasons: for every permutations γ there exists at
least a pair s, t ∈ S such that either




• either R̄(s, t) or R̄′(γ(s), γ(t)) is not defined.
Let us analyze the latter case. Without loss of generality, assume that
S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉 and S
′
= 〈S,R′1, . . . , R
′
n; R̄
′〉 are such that Ri ≡ R
′
i
for i = 1, . . . , n while R̄(s, t) and not R̄
′
(γ(s), γ(t)) (nor R̄
′
(γ(t), γ(s))),
in particular for γ ≡ IdS. Since S,S
′ ∈ Ŝf , R̄ = f(R1, . . . , Rn) and
R̄
′
= f(R1, . . . , Rn). But then, since we assumed that R̄ 6≡ R̄
′
we have a
contradiction because f is assumed to be a function.
Now suppose that DS̄({s, t}) 6= DS̄
′
({γ−1(s), γ−1(t)}) for at least a pair of
alternatives, s and t. According to the ⇒ part of this proof there exist two




in FGS such that f
′
(R1, . . . , Rn) = R̄
and f
′′
(R1, . . . , Rn) = R̄
′
. On the other hand we have that f
′
(R1, . . . , Rn) ⊆
f(R1, . . . , Rn) and f
′′
(R1, . . . , Rn) ⊆ f(R1, . . . , Rn), but this is absurd since
f is prime. This shows that there exists an equivalence class S̄ ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS),
such that Ŝf ⊆ S̄.
Now assume that there exists a situation S ∈ S̄ and S /∈ Ŝf . This means
that if S is 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉, with R̄ 6≡ f(R1, . . . , Rn), there must ex-
ist a situation S ′ = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; f(R1, . . . , Rn)〉 ∈ Ŝf . But then, for
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every permutation γ, there must exist at least a pair s, t ∈ S such that
DS({s, t}) 6= DS
′
({γ−1(s), γ−1(t)}). Absurd, since S and S ′ are both in S̄.
Therefore Ŝf = S̄. 2
Proof of Proposition 2 For every aggregation function f there exists a
family {f j}j∈J−0 of prime aggregation functions such that each f j  f .
Consider each R̄ ∈ Im(f). If R̄ 6= ∅ just consider the equivalence classes
associated to each prime function according to Theorem 1: {S̄j}j∈J−0 ⊆
Ŝ/ 'D(GS). It is clear that for each profS such that S ∈ ∪j∈J−0 S̄
j we have
that there exists at least a j ∈ J−0 that verifies that f j(profS) = R̄. On
the other hand, if R = ∅ then consider S̄0 the class of all the situations of
the form 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; ∅〉. This class corresponds to the prime function f0
such that f0(profS) = ∅. Then, if we consider the class J = J−0 ∪ {0}, we
have that f(profS) = R̄ for every S ∈ ∪j∈J S̄j.2
Proof of Theorem 2 First of all, let us note that each chain C in 〈〈FGS ,
〉 has a length, defined as its cardinality and denoted as |C|. Consider first
the case in which |C| ≤ ℵ0, i.e. that C is countable. If C = 〈f0, f1, . . . , f |C|〉,
f0 is the only prime aggregation function in C. According to Theorem 1,
for f0 there exists a S̄0 ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) such that f
0(prof(S)) = R̄ for every
S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉 ∈ S̄0. We will prove by induction that for each fk ∈ C
there exists an element πk in a partition Πα
k
such that fk(prof(S)) = R̄ for
every S = 〈S,R1, . . . , Rn; R̄〉 ∈ πk. Moreover, that Πα
k




• Consider the case of f1. According to Proposition 2 we have that there
exists {S̄j}j∈J ⊆ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) such that f(profS) = R̄ for every S =
〈S, profS ; R̄〉 ∈ ∪j∈J S̄j. Suppose that S̄0 6= S̄j for every j ∈ J , but
then this means that f0(profS) 6= f1(profS) for every S ∈ S̄0. Absurd,
since we assumed that f0  f1. Then S̄0 ∈ {S̄j}j∈J . That is, while f0
is supported by S̄0 ∈ Ŝ/ 'D(GS), f
1 is supported by S̄0∪j∈J,j 6=0S̄j. If we
call S̄0, π0 and Ŝ/ 'D(GS), Π
α0, we see that if we denote S̄0∪j∈J,j 6=0 S̄j




while π1 ∩ S̄j
′
= ∅ for every j′ /∈ J . That means that π1 and {S̄j
′
}j′ /∈J
constitute a partition of Ŝ, which we call Πα1. Since for π0 ∈ Πα0,





/∈ J , Πα1 is a coarsening of Πα0.
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• Assume that the result is valid up to k. That is, fk is supported by a
πk ∈ Παk . Without loss of generality we assume that if fk is supported,
according to Proposition 2, by a family {S̄ l}l∈L ⊆ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) then
πk = ∪l∈LS̄ l and Πα
k
= {πk, {S̄ l
′
}l′ /∈L}. Now consider the case of
fk+1. Again, by Proposition 2, we have that there exists {S̄j}j∈J ⊆
Ŝ/ 'D(Gn,GS) such that f
k+1(profS) = R̄ for every S ∈ ∪j∈J S̄j. Since
fk  fk+1 we have that fk(profS) ⊆ fk+1(profS) for every S ∈ πk.
That is, πk ∈ {S̄j}j∈J . Let us call the latter πk+1. We have that πk+1
and {S̄j
′
}j′ /∈J is a partition of Ŝ which we call Π
αk+1. It is clear that
πk ⊆ πk+1 and S̄j ⊆ πk+1 for j ∈ J , while S̄j
′
∈ Παk+1 for j′ /∈ J .
Therefore, Πα
k+1
is a coarsening of Πα
k
.
Therefore, the claim is proved for every k.
Now consider the case in which |C| > ℵ0. Then, the set of indexes k in
C = 〈f0, f1, . . . , f |C|〉 can be decomposed in two classes, those of the functions





= k + 1 (the successor indexes) and those which verify that
k
′
= limk<k′k, the limit indexes. The proof for the countable length of C
applies also for the successor indexes. The following is the proof for the limit
indexes:
• Assume that the result is valid for each k < k′ for a limit index
k
′
. That is, each fk is supported by a πk ∈ Παk and, as fk is sup-
ported by a family {S̄ l}l∈L ⊆ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) then π
k = ∪l∈LS̄ l and
Πα
k
= {πk, {S̄ l
′




k1 is a refinement of Πα
k2 . Let us now consider fk
′
. By Propo-
sition 2 we have that there exists {S̄j}j∈J ⊆ Ŝ/ 'D(GS) such that
fk
′
(profS) = R̄ for every S ∈ ∪j∈J S̄j. For every fk  fk+1 we
have that fk(profS) ⊆ fk
′
(profS) for every S ∈ πk. That is, each
πk ∈ {S̄j}j∈J . Let us call the latter πk
′





}j′ /∈J is a partition of Ŝ which we call Π
αk
′
. It is clear that for
each k < k
′
, πk ⊆ πk
′
and S̄j ⊆ πk
′







/∈ J . Therefore, Παk
′
is a coarsening of {Παk}k<k′ .2
Proof of Proposition 3 According to Theorem 2, C generates a chain of
partitions, and particularly of equivalence classes, a πk for each fk ∈ C.
31
Since each πk is fully described by DEC(fk), we have that C generates
also a sequence of the form CDEC = {DEC(fk)}|C|k=0. To see that CDEC
is a chain under ⊆, just consider the fact that for k < k′, for every
profile profS we have that f
k(profS) ⊆ fk
′
(profS). Since, in particular
fk(profS)(s, t) ⊆ fk
′
(profS)(s, t) for each situation S and every pair s, t ∈ S,
the class of agents that are decisive over s and t for the former function,
Dk({s, t}) ∈ FkGS (S̄) ⊆ DEC(f
k) is also a class of decisive agents over s and
t for the latter. That is, Dk({s, t}) ∈ Fk
′
GS (S̄) ⊆ DEC(f
k
′




Proof of Proposition 4 Trivial. Suppose S∗ ∈ SUPP(f j) for j < j∗.
Then, there would exist S ′ ∈ SUPP(f j∗), such that for a given pair
s, t ∈ S and a permutation γ, DS∗({s, t}) ⊆ DS
′
({γ(s), γ(t)}). Then, either
DS
∗
({s, t}) = DS
′
({γ(s), γ(t)}) (in which case S∗ is decision-equivalent to
S ′ and therefore S∗ ∈ SUPP(f j∗)) or DS∗({s, t}) ⊂ DS
′
({γ(s), γ(t)}). But
then, since DEC(f j) ⊆ DEC(f j∗), there will exist a decisive set for a pair s
and t, D({s, t}) ∈ DEC(f j∗) for which there does not exist a of permutation
γ such that DS
∗
({s, t}) ⊆ D({γ(s), γ(t)}). Contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 7 By construction, each θ ∈
⋃
H(f) is θ =
〈i,PS ,Gn,GS〉, i.e. a single individual and a pair of states over which
she is decisive(plus the permutations that preserve her decisiveness). Then
θ ∈ H for a H ∈ H(f). Define then Υ(θ) as the corresponding H. 2
Proof of Lemma 1 The first claim follows immediately from Definition
10 and Proposition 6. The characterization of the sentences in Af follows








in Hf independently of S and n being finite or not. 2
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